Let’s imagine Jasper, a thirteen-year-old boy. Jasper lives in an average suburb and attends an average middle school which subjects him to average social concerns. He wants to impress girls, wants to be popular, wants to avoid getting pounded into his locker every time the football players pass by.
Jasper has a closet full of shirts. Jasper can wear any of those shirts any day he wants to, provided it’s clean. Luckily for Jasper, his dad does laundry every night, so Jasper can always wear any of his shirts.
There are a number of factors influencing Jasper’s choice of shirts: his mother likes him to wear the shirts with collars because they make him look responsible, a girl once told him he looks good in green so he thinks he’ll do better with the ladies if he wears green shirts, the football players pick on him less if he wears a Vikings jersey. The problem is that Jasper doesn’t like any of those shirts. Jasper likes his plain blue T-shirt, the one he wore to the zoo last summer, the one he wore when he won a chess match.
Long setup to get to this analogy: Jasper can choose to wear any shirt he owns for any reason, but he can’t choose which shirt will be his favorite. Likewise, a person can choose what they say about belief, they can choose what church to attend, they can choose whether to sing hymns, chant chants, or take communion. But they can’t choose what they believe.
Something could happen to change which shirt is Jasper’s favorite, but it won’t be an act of his will. He could have a great day while wearing his Adrian Peterson replica jersey—maybe the football players invite him to a party where they have soda and pie. However, he can’t decide that this morning he likes the football jersey better than the blue T-shirt. And so it is (it seems to me) with belief. Something could happen to change what I believe, but it won’t be my decision. I may be introduced to a new idea, a new perception, that changes what I believe, but I can’t decide to believe one thing instead of another.
Or is there something I'm missing?
9 comments:
One distinction that seems to be important to understand is that the nature of the traditional notion of 'belief' is (strictly speaking) an unverifiable epistemic construct.
What I mean by this is that it seems to be the case that one of the fundamental attributes of belief as you are considering it is that it needn't have any consequences in reality. That is, there can be a purely internal monologue with myself, in which I believe something, but it never alters the way in which I perceive or react to the world around me.
The epistemic problem can be resolved if you take a very 'hume-like' response to this and say that belief is defined as the things which cause you to have reactions or decisions the way you do.
At that point, then yes, I can choose what I believe, because I can choose how I react to input.
However, I would agree that this is contrary to the traditional religious notion of belief which would seem to reject that belief is a function of decision, and assert that belief is about something complete internal and unverifiable.
So to look at your analogy, in my definition Jasper actually can choose which shirt is his favorite, because his favorite is only measured by (given no scarcity as you postulated) which shirt he wears most often.
okay... that's enough for me today. we now return you to regularly scheduled computer drunk version of denny.
I'm not sure I entirely agree with a point that Denny made. He said that, all things being equal, the "favorite" shirt is whichever shirt Jasper wears the most. I'm not sure this is necessarily true. It may be that Jasper treasures his blue shirt, and so avoids wearing it frivolously, which would cause premature wear-and-tear on the shirt. He might wear another shirt more often simply because of how much he treasures the blue shirt. At this point, I was planning to construct a brilliant and awe-inspiring connection tying this analysis of analogy to the discussion of belief, but the clock just struck 12 and my brain has shut down. I'll try to fill in the brilliant part tomorrow.
I agree with you that you cannot control the circumstances in your life which may affect what you believe or why you believe it, but you still have the choice.
For example, let's say that you survive a horrific car accident and walk away virtually unscathed. You choose to believe that it was an act of God or that you were one lucky S.O.B.
Whichever way you choose, it is still your choice. You may find people willing to argue either point, but it is ultimately your decision. There is no scientific evidence to support either theory, so it is up to you.
This does not mean that you can apply that logic to everything. You cannot argue that the sun rises in the north and sets in the south. Fact dictates that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west if you are on this planet.
Facts help us define our beliefs, as do our own perceptions, but they do not make the choices for us. That is up to the individual.
Denny-
Welcome to the fray.
I have a few objections/ clarifications to make based on your comments:
“[T]he nature of the traditional notion of 'belief' is (strictly speaking) an unverifiable epistemic construct.”
Yes, that’s true. A belief, when subjected to tests such as that of verifiability by the logical positivists, is an ‘unverifiable epistemic construct.’” But that’s neither here nor there in regard to what we’re hashing out here.
”[I]t seems to be the case that one of the fundamental attributes of belief as you are considering it is that it needn't have any consequences in reality.”
Then either you’ve misunderstood me or I’ve made myself unclear somehow. I imagine belief as having concrete causes in the believer’s experience. Whatever results from these beliefs are, for the moment, beside the point, as we’re just looking at the construction, adoption, or change of belief. So far.
“[T]here can be a purely internal monologue with myself, in which I believe something, but it never alters the way in which I perceive or react to the world around me.”
I agree. If you think that unicorns are sometimes purple but never green that probably has no connection to reality. Either by cause or effect. I wonder about beliefs that result from reality but have no impact on further action and vice versa.
”The epistemic problem can be resolved if you take a very 'hume-like' response to this and say that belief is defined as the things which cause you to have reactions or decisions the way you do.”
I’m pretty sure that’s a misrepresentation of Hume’s conception of “belief.” Instead of “the things which cause you to have reactions or decisions the way you do” I’d insert “the long-term storage of your impressions of the world, which may in turn influence your reactions to stimuli.” Similar to Leibniz’s “apperception.” I’m open to correction, though. It’s been years since I’ve read Hume.
”At that point, then yes, I can choose what I believe, because I can choose how I react to input.”
Can you, though? If you see a baby barbecued on a spit can you choose to be complacent? Or, if you swing the other way, can you choose to be disgusted instead of unmoved?
There may be more to this, and I’m open to all possibilities, but this seems unlikely.
”[T]his is contrary to the traditional religious notion of belief which would seem to reject that belief is a function of decision, and assert that belief is about something complete internal and unverifiable.”
This is what I’m getting at. Most believers I encounter posit belief as a function of the will, contrary to what you’re saying. This is actually the point of my last several posts. When people tell me I can decide to believe that there is one god and that Jesus is His only Son, or when others tell me that there is no god but God and His name is Allah, I am bewildered, because I can’t see a way to choose belief.
”So to look at your analogy, in my definition Jasper actually can choose which shirt is his favorite, because his favorite is only measured by (given no scarcity as you postulated) which shirt he wears most often.”
That isn’t what the analogy says. Actually, the causes for Jasper’s bestowing ‘favorite’ status on the shirt are explicitly stated.
”[O]kay... that's enough for me today. we now return you to regularly scheduled computer drunk version of denny.”
You’ve raised some interesting questions. I’m not sure they’re on point, but they’ll get into the mix.
M.Filly
I think the ideas you have on that part of the analogy are valid, especially concerning the connection between "favorite" status and frequency of wear.
But you're right. You probably need some sleep.
Hey, Rich-
Thanks for playing. Here are some responses:
“[L]et's say that you survive a horrific car accident and walk away virtually unscathed. You choose to believe that it was an act of God or that you were one lucky S.O.B.”
Do you, though? Do you really look at it objectively, examine both possibilities, and choose entirely on your own which is the most likely explanation of what happened? Or does one seem more likely than the other prior to your examination?
”Whichever way you choose, it is still your choice. You may find people willing to argue either point, but it is ultimately your decision. There is no scientific evidence to support either theory, so it is up to you.”
I don’t know that it is, though. And that’s why I’m asking this question. If someone keys your car can you choose to believe it’s your brother instead of the guy at work who hates you and was hanging around your car yesterday? Or does one just appear more likely than the other, based on experience and reason?
”This does not mean that you can apply that logic to everything. You cannot argue that the sun rises in the north and sets in the south. Fact dictates that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west if you are on this planet.”
That’s comforting.
”Facts help us define our beliefs, as do our own perceptions, but they do not make the choices for us. That is up to the individual.”
Choice certainly is up to the individual. But I’m doubtful that choice extends to what we believe about the world.
I'm slightly afraid to drip some slightly Jungian ideas across dear Jasper's carpet, but here goes:
You corrected Denny by redefining belief as:
"the long-term storage of your impressions of the world, which may in turn influence your reactions to stimuli."
I find myself wondering how some concept of ancestral/genetic memory would effect belief, in which case the "long-term storage" would be poly-generational, not restricted to a single life's experiences. My own views on the idea of ancestral memory are still somewhat amorphous, but if such a thing exists, can enough generations of Jasper's family like blue that it just comes naturally to him?
I recently heard someone say that Christianity has been around long enough to become a part of our DNA. I wanted to laugh in her face, but what if something similar were possible? Can a belief be so ingrained in a familial lineage that the belief itself, or at least a predisposition to it, can become genetic (nature), or is it solely exposure to those previous generations of believers that makes us believe as we do (nurture)?
I am aware that this line of questioning is hearkening back to my comment regarding inherited belief a couple posts ago. No, I'm not hung up on the idea, this is a distinct offshoot.
I would also like to state for the record, Jason, that I appreciate your going fairly easy on me since I am a relative philosophical light-weight. I guess I occasionally need to get out of the blogging kiddie pool and really get into deep waters.
It might seem like I'm going easy, but the reality is I'm trying to not be too technical. Philosophers have been noodling with this idea for millennia, and any number of deep thinkers have taken it up since Descartes--or maybe Bacon.
I figure I'll do the world (and my brain) a favor if I keep the consideration of the material deep, but in pedestrian terms. So it has some application to people's real lives and such.
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